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KATSENbu-WBOGb-W v. KATSENELENBOGEN: THROUGH THE EYES 
OF THE VICTIM - MARYLAND'S CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER 
AND THE ROLE OF THE COURT. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sixty-two men, women and children died in Maryland as a result of 
domestic violence in 1999. I This means that one person dies approxi-
mately every six days in Maryland at the hands of a loved one.2 Of 
those victims, twenty-six were female, twenty-six were male, and ten 
were suicide victims who killed themselves after murdering their loved 
ones.3 Nationally, it is estimated that there are approximately four 
million incidents of domestic violence against women alone each 
year. 4 Additionally, the United States Surgeon General found that 
"the single largest cause of injury to women in the United States" is 
the result of beatings by their husbands, ex-husbands, or lovers and 
that these beatings accounted for an astounding one-fifth of all hospi-
tal emergency room visits by women in the United States.5 
Notwithstanding these statistics, domestic violence has historically 
gone unnoticed. Heightened legal and social scrutiny of domestic vio-
lence did not occur until recent decades. 6 Since then, domestic abuse 
has gained widespread public attention.7 State legislatures began to 
recognize the problem and mandated a response. 8 The Maryland 
General Assembly reacted in 1980 by enacting the domestic violence 
statute.9 Over the following decades the Maryland legislature broad-
l. Crime in Maryland-The 1999 Maryland Uniform Crime Report (1999). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. It is estimated that only 10% of domestic violence crimes were reported 
in 1999. Id. 
4. Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARv. L. REv. 
1498, 1501 (1993) [herinafter Developments in the Law]; see also Catherine F. 
Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An 
Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801, 809 (1993) 
("Most national estimates are obtained from surveys which have typically 
excluded the very poor, those who do not speak English fluently, those 
whose lives are especially chaotic, military families, and persons who are 
hospitalized, homeless, institutionalized, or incarcerated."). 
5. Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990,83 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46,46 (1992) (quoting Nikki R. Van Hightower 
& Susan A. McManus, Limits of State Constitutional Guarantees: Lesson from 
1<-Yforts to Implement Domestic Violence Policies, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 269 (1989». 
6. Developments in the Law, sU/JTa note 4, at 150-53. 
7. Klein, supra note 4, at 810. 
8. See id. 
9. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 4-501 to 4-516 (Supp. 2002); see also Coburn v. 
Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 252, 674 A.2d 951, 955 (1996); see infra Part III. 
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ened the availability of protections to victims of domestic violence. 10 
Passing the statute provided both civil and criminal remedies for vic-
tims of domestic violence for the first time in Maryland. II Included in 
this statutory provision was the availability of the civil protection or-
der. I2 The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Katsenelenbogen v. Kat-
senelenbogen,I3 recently clarified the proper standard for the issuance 
of the civil protection order that is, perhaps, the most integral weapon 
against domestic violence. I4 
Parts II and III of this Comment will explore both the historical 
background and Maryland's legislative action, which preceded the 
Katsenelenbogen decision. I5 Part IV of this Comment details the proce-
dural aspects of Maryland's, as well as other states' current domestic 
violence statutes. I6 Part V explores the Katsenelenbogen decision and its 
impact on Maryland's domestic violence jurisprudenceP Finally, 
Parts VI and VII of this Comment will illustrate, notwithstanding the 
problems inherent in the battle against domestic violence, that 
through greater education and awareness within the legal community, 
the civil protection order and the courts can playa vital role in win-
ning this battle. IS 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Historically, women and children were effectively ignored under 
common law. I9 The early Anglo-American common law provided that 
the husband was the "master of his household" and permitted him to 
use "chastisement" or "corporal punishment" on his wife so long as 
the punishment did not permanently injure her.20 The medieval doc-
trine of covertures erased the identity of women upon their marriage 
while mandating that they assent to the sexual advances of their hus-
10. See infra Part III. 
11. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-508 (Supp. 2002). 
12. See id. §§ 4-505 - 4-506. 
13. 365 Md. 122,775 A.2d 1249 (2001). 
14. Id. at 138-39, 775 A.2d at 1259. The required standard is an individualized 
objective standard measuring a victim's fear of imminent serious bodily 
harm. Id.; see infra note 203 and accompanying text; see also infra Parts V. & 
VI. 
15. See infra notes 19-112 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 113-169 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 170-205 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 206-55 and accompanying text; see also Klein, supra note 4, at 
811; Regina DuFresne and Jonathan S. Greene, Increasing Remediesfor Domes-
tic Violence: A Study of Maryland's Domestic Violence Act in the Courtroom, 6 MD. 
]. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 155, 172 (1995). See generally Peter Finn and Sa-
rah Colson, Civil Protection Orders: Legislation, Current Court Practice, and En-
forcement, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE (Mar. 1990). 
19. See Judge Michael]. Voris, The Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order and the 
Role of the Court, 24 AKRON L. REv. 423, 423-24 (1990). 
20. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE LJ. 2117,2118 (1996). 
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bands.2' It is apparent that women were treated as mere property in-
terests of the husband until the early nineteenth century.22 
Unfortunately, the treatment of children during this era paralleled 
that of women.23 This abuse not only affects the women but also the 
children who, in most cases, witness this violence against their 
mothers.24 Statistically, between fIfty-three and seventy percent of 
men who beat women also abuse children.25 Additionally, children 
were often injured while their mothers were being beaten by the reck-
less behavior of their fathers. 26 Unfortunately, although indicative of 
the attitude at that time, the fIrst juvenile court providing child pro-
tection was not established until 1899, more than sixty years after one 
of the fIrst reported cases of child abuse.27 
Courts gradually began to recognize the rights of both women and 
children. Yet, while the courts refused to endorse chastisement, they 
often avoided intervention under the veil of family privacy.28 As long 
as the family member was not permanently injured, the courts consid-
ered it better for the families to "draw the curtain, shut out the public 
gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive."29 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, state legislatures around 
the country made some progress towards protecting women and chil-
dren.30 Cities began establishing domestic relations courts staffed 
with social workers to help alleviate the problems of domestic vio-
lence.3' However, both the criminal and civil justice systems contin-
ued to take a "therapeutic" role rather than one of punishment.32 
Families were urged to seek counseling and attempt to reconcile.33 
For example, as recently as the 1960's police officers were simply en-
couraged to preserve the peace when answering domestic violence 















Voris, supra note 19, at 423-24. 
Id. at 423. 
Id. at 423-24. 
Zorza, supra note 5, at 4M7. 
Id. at 47. 
Id. Sixty-two percent of sons over the age of fourteen who attempted to 
intervene to protect their mothers were injured. Id. 
Voris, supra note 19, at 424. 
IRA M. ELLMAN, ET AL., FAMILY LAw: CAsES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 162 (3d ed. 
1998) (hereinafter "ELLMAN"); Seigel, supra note 20, at 2118. 
ELLMAN, supra note 28, at 162 (quoting North Carolina v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60 
(1874)). 
Id.; Seigel, supra note 20, at 2117-18. 
ELLMAN, supra note 28, at 162. These shelters, however, were virtually non-
existent in Maryland during the early stages of the fight against domestic 
violence. 
See ELLMAN, supra note 28, at 162. 
Id. 
Id. at 161-62. The training bulletin of the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police offered these instructions for domestic violence 
encounters: 
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The advent of the women's movement during the 1970's finally 
brought about a gradual retreat from the legal and law enforcement 
community's "therapeutic" view on domestic violence.35 Currently, 
many cities have shelters for battered women and mechanisms by 
which they can obtain protection and live in relative safety.36 For wo-
men, years of arduous protesting and lawsuits finally effectuated 
change.37 
An example of such change was the United States government's re-
sponse via the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA").38 Unfortu-
nately, a divided United States Supreme Court subsequently ruled this 
Act unconstitutional in United States v. Morrison. 39 Although the Court 
ruled the civil remedy of the VAWA unconstitutional,40 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist endorsed the available criminal sanctions "as an appropri-
ate exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause authority."41 The en-
dorsement of a federal criminal remedy for "interstate crimes of 
abuse" aided in this ongoing fight. 
Maryland, just as the rest of the nation, has benefited from this 
Act.42 This Act has made available in Maryland "grants to encourage 
arrests"43 as well as "civil legal assistance"44 for those in need.45 Mter 
For the most part these disputes are personal matters requiring no 
direct police action .... Once inside the home, the officer's sole 
purpose is to preserve the peace ... attempt to soothe feelings, pac-
ify parties. . . suggest parties refer their problem to a church or a 
community agency. . .. In dealing with family disputes the power 
of arrest should be exercised as a last resort. The officer should 
never create a problem when there is only a family problem 
existing. 
Id. at 163. 
35. See id; see also Jane Murphy, Engaging With the State: The Growing Reliance on 
Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & 
L. (forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Murphy]. 
36. ELLMAN, supra note 28, at 163. 
37. Id. 
38. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-332-108 Stat. 1796 
(1994). 
39. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
40. [d. The approach taken by the Supreme Court has been criticized. Riva B. 
Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and 
Family, 115 HARV. L. REv. 949, 1024-25, 1035-44. 
4l. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613-14 n.5 (2000). 
42. Office on Violence Against Women, State try State Office on Violence Against 
Women Grant Activities, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/stategrants.htm 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2003). 
43. Office on Violence Against Women, Grants to Encourage Arrest Policies, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/map/arrest/1998/mdgtea.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 2, 2003). 
44. Office on Violence Against Women, Civil Legal Assistance Grant Program, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/map/civiI/2000/mdcla.htm (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2003). 
45. Office on Violence Against Women, Maryland, at http://www.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/vawo/map/md.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2003). 
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the advent of the VAWA, several states attempted to battle the domes-
tic violence problem within their own borders.46 
Finally, the legislature enacted the federal Violence Against Women 
Act of 2000 ("VAWA II").47 While the first version of the Act made 
important strides against domestic violence, VAWA II mandated a na-
tional commitment aimed at fighting the ongoing problem of domes-
tic violence through federal funding. 48 The statute sends federal 
money to state law school clinics, domestic violence shelters and legal 
service offices in an effort to promote the fight against domestic vio-
lence at the state level. 49 
Notwithstanding the respective efforts of the federal and state gov-
ernments, domestic violence still exists and is still widely considered a 
personal matter not within the reach of the courts or law enforce-
ment.50 This is the precise reason why all fifty states now have a ver-
sion of the civil protection order,51 which mandates both court and 
law enforcement participation in instances where persons eligible for 
relief are in fear of harm. 52 
III. MARYLAND'S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
A. The 1980 Domestic Violence Act 
Maryland was late in joining the rest of the country in granting 
some form of statutory protection against domestic violence. 53 In the 
years preceding 1980, a victim of domestic violence was without sub-
stantial redress under the law. 54 In 1980, however, the Maryland Leg-
46. Martha R. Burt et aI., Evaluation of the Stop Block Grants to Combat Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: 1996 Re-
part, at http://www.ncjrs.org/vaw-chp3.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2003). 
47. Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 1114 Stat. 1464 
(2000). 
48. Murphy, supra note 35, at nn.21-24 and accompanying text. 
49. Id. 
50. See, e.g., South Mountain Community College, Counseling Department, Do-
mestic Violence, at http://www.smc.Maricopa.edu/ services/ counseling/ do-
mestic_violence.html (last visited Sept. 14,2002) (explaining that only half 
of domestic violence victims report the crime to the police because they 
consider it to be a private or personal matter). 
51. For an in-depth analysis of state civil protection order statutes, see Klein, 
supra note 4; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1515-18, 1535-
43. 
52. See Elizabeth Topliffe, Why Civil Protection Orders Are l!.1fective Remedies for Do-
mestic Violence but Mutual Protective Orders Are Not?, 67 IND. LJ. 1039, 1042-43 
(1992). The standard for the issuance of the civil protection order varies 
within each state, although they are all designed to remove the petitioner 
from a dangerous situation. See infra Part IV for a comparison. 
53. See Susan Carol Elgin, Domestic Violence: Is Maryland Responding?, 28 MD. BAR 
J. 43 (1995). 
54. Id. 
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islature enacted the Domestic Violence Act ("1980 Act").55 At that 
time, the frequency of domestic violence throughout the state was un-
known because domestic assaults were grouped along with statewide 
assault numbers, which made it difficult to ascertain the effectiveness 
of the Act.56 
The 1980 Act was only a beginning in what was, and still is, an ongo-
ing battle against domestic violence.57 The statute, as enacted in 
1980, was restrictive in terms of whom it protected and the time limit 
of the order. 58 The definition of abuse was confined to: 1) causing 
serious bodily harm, 2) placing another in fear of imminent serious 
bodily harm, or 3) sexual abuse of a child as defined in the criminal 
code.59 The 1980 Act only protected a "household member" who was 
defined as a "spouse, blood relative or step relation as long as the 
members resided together when the abuse occurred."60 Additionally, 
couples that were not married could not obtain protection under the 
1980 Act.61 
In terms of the duration of the order, the original act only allowed 
for a temporary ex-parte order to last for five days and a subsequent 
protective order to last for only fifteen days, including the time the 
temporary order was in effect.62 Such a short period of time provided 
little help in preventing subsequent abuse.63 The inadequacies of the 
1980 Act were revealed in that, after its inception, only 12 domestic 
violence programs existed, operating only 4 shelters. Although sev-
eral changes were made to the 1980 Act in the following years, Mary-
land's laws still ranked "among the worst in the nation for providing 
protection to victims. "64 
B. The 1992 Amendments 
Fortunately for Maryland's domestic violence victims, the legislature 
recognized these problems and responded with a major overhaul of 












MD. CODE fum., FAM. LAw §§ 4-504 - 4-516 (Supp. 2002); Elgin, supra note 
53, at 43. This act included relief via the civil protection order. MD. CODE 
ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 4-504.1 - 4-506. 
Elgin, supra note 53, at 43. Domestic assault statistics were not separately 
compiled until 1982. Id. 
Id. at 44. 
Id. 
Id; see supra note 68 and accompanying text for the current, more expan-
sive, definition. 




Id.; see also DuFresne, supra note 18, at 155 (stating that Maryland's civil 
protection order was ineffective because it afforded protection to a narrow 
group of individuals for a relatively limited amount of time). 
Elgin, supra note 53, at 44; see also DuFresne, supra note 18, at 155. 
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of relief in comparison to the original statute.66 The changes "ex-
panded the classes of persons eligible for relief, added types of relief 
and extended the possible length of orders."67 
The amendments expanded the definition of "abuse" to its current 
meaning: "battery or assault and battery, serious bodily injury or 
threat of such an injury; rape or sexual assault offense; or attempted 
rape or sexual offense; false imprisonment and abuse of a child or 
vulnerable adult."68 Further amendments in the following years ad-
ded mental injury to a child to this definition.69 Clearly, these 
changes created an avenue for protection that was missing from the 
1980 Act.70 
Furthermore, the 1992 amendments afforded protection to those 
who previously were without redress.71 The amendments expanded 
the group of persons eligible for relief under the act to include "for-
mer spouses, current spouses who were not household members, co-
habitants and vulnerable adults."72 
The type of relief granted was also expanded to include emergency 
family maintenance.73 Marylandjudges were empowered to grant the 
petitioner exclusive use and possession of the family home, or the au-
tomobile, for employment and childcare purposes.74 Additionally, 
the order now protects a victim much longer than 15 days?5 Mary-
land courts currently have the authority to grant an order for a year in 
duration.76 
66. Elgin, supra note 53, at 44; see also DuFresne, supra note 18, at 155. 
67. Elgin, supra note 53, at 44; see also DuFresne, supra note 18, at 155. 
68. Elgin, supra note 53, at 44-45; see also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-501 (b) 
(Supp. 2002). 
69. Elgin, supra note 53, at 45. In the years preceding this amendment, Mary-
land was the only state in the nation that failed to recognize mental injury 
to children. Id. The Act defines "mental injury" as "observable, identifi-
able, and substantial impairment of a child's mental or psychological ability 
to function. The mental illness needs to be verified by two of the following: 
1) licensed physician, 2) licensed psychologist or licensed social worker." 
Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id.; see also DuFresne, supra note 18, at 157. 
72. Elgin, supra note 53, at 45. "Cohabitant" is defined as a "person who has 
shared a sexual relationship with the respondent and resided with the re-
spondent in the home for a period of at least 90 days within 1 year before 
the filing of the petition." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-501 (d) (Supp. 
2002). 
73. Elgin, supra note 53, at 45. Emergency family maintenance includes "finan-
cial support to be paid by the abuser to the victim during the period of the 
order.' Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-501 (g) (Supp. 2002). 
74. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(d) (Supp. 2002); see also Elgin, supra 
note 53, at 45. 
75. See Elgin, supra note 53, at 44. 
76. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw. § 4-506(g) (Supp. 2002). 
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C. The 1994 Domestic Violence Act 
The changes in 1992 elevated Maryland domestic law from the 
ranks of the nation's worst;77 however, Maryland's domestic violence 
victims and the legislature continued to work on the complex 
problems inherent in domestic disputes. 78 In 1994, the legislature 
amended the 1980 Act to allow Maryland's police officers to arrest an 
abuser without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe the 
abuser violated an already existing order. 79 In addition to the ex-
panded arrest capabilities, under these new amendments, police are 
also authorized to remove any firearms from the family home.80 
Additional changes granted more protection to a victim of domestic 
violence.81 In charges of assault and battery, the court can compel a 
spouse-victim to testify against the abuser if "1) the charge is the sec-
ond offense within the same year and 2) the spouse-victim refused to 
testify when sworn in a previous trial invoking 'spousal privilege.' "82 
Additionally, in Coburn v. Coburn, the court of appeals held that the 
Maryland Rules of Evidence section 404(b) is inapplicable in protec-
tive order hearings.83 The court explained that the purpose of admit-
ting evidence of prior abuse in domestic violence protective order 
hearings is not to prove the respondent's propensity for violence, but 
to prove the likelihood of future abuse.84 
D. Were These Changes Effective? 
The results of a study conducted by Maryland's non-profit Public 
Justice Center, just after the amendments, were positive.85 In the 
study, trained volunteers observed over two hundred domestic VIo-
77. DuFresne, supra note IB, at 155; see Elgin, supra note 53, at 44. 
7B. See DuFresne, supra note IB, at 177; Elgin, supra note 53, at 45-46. 
79. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-515; see also Elgin, supra note 53, at 46. 
80. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-511. 
81. See Elgin, supra note 53, at 46. 
82. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (2002); see also Elgin, supra note 
53, at 46. 
83. Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 259-60, 674 A.2d 951, 959 (1996) (holding 
that allegations of prior history of abuse are admissible at a protective order 
hearing regardless of whether such allegations were sufficiently pleaded in 
the original petition for protection); see also MD. R. EVlD. § 5-404(b) (2002). 
B4. Coburn, 342 Md. at 260, 674 A.2d at 959. 
85. See DuFresne, supra note 18, at 176-77. The compilation and report of this 
study are comprehensively discussed in the DuFresne article. [d. DuFresne 
comments that while there existed some room for error in the study (i.e. 
courtroom observers had to guess petitioners' and respondents' ages by 
sight), the safeguards taken by the Public Justice Center in conducting, 
compiling, and reporting the study helped ensure its credibility. [d. at 164, 
167. For a detailed description of the study's methodology see section III 
of the DuFresne article. [d. at 163-64. 
2003] Maryland's Civil Protection Order 245 
lence cases in six differentjurisdictions.s6 The volunteers studied and 
collected data on numerous matters ranging from the characteristics 
of the petitioners, respondents and lawyers, to the duration of the 
hearings, in an attempt to ascertain the effectiveness of changes in the 
law.s7 
The findings indicate that victims, lawyers and judges are taking ad-
vantage of the more expansive relief available under the 1994 version 
of the statute.ss For example, in many cases, abusers were ordered 
away from the victims' school, place of employment and home.s9 Fur-
thermore, some judges took full advantage of newly added provisions, 
granting sole use and possession of the family vehicle to victims dur-
ing the order's duration.90 Additionally, almost all the orders granted 
were of longer duration than that offered by the 1980 statute.91 It is 
important to note, however, that not all judges took full advantage of 
the additional protections available to the petitioner.92 A few judges 
ordered protective orders of only 30 days, the shortest duration availa-
ble under more recent version of the ACt.93 Moreover, in a couple of 
cases, judges failed to utilize any of the new remedies now available 
after the amendments.94 
A recent study tided, Ecological Model of Battered Women's Experience 
Over Time,95 indicates that while problems still exist with the imple-











Id. at IS5-S6. The jurisdictions included were Anne Arundel County, Balti-
more City, Baltimore County, Howard County, Montgomery County and 
Prince George's County. Id. at lS6 n.S. 
Id. at lS6. 
Id. at 176. 
Id. According to the study, the court ordered, at the ex-parte level, the re-
spondent to stay away from the victim's residence in 7S% of the cases. [d. at 
170. In SO% of the cases at the ex-parte level, the judges ordered the abuser 
to vacate the home. Id. In 40% of the cases at the ex-parte level, the abusers 
were ordered to remain away from the petitioner's place of work. Id. The 
protective order hearing stage saw more consent orders, extensions and 
continuances. Id. at 174. In the forty-seven cases where the judge found in 
favor of the petitioner, however, the respondent was ordered to refrain 
from making abusive threats 8S.1 % of the time. Id. The respondent was 
ordered to refrain from contacting or harassing the petitioner in 61.7% of 
these cases. Id. Finally, at the protective order stage, the respondent was 
ordered to vacate the home only 29.8% of the time. Id. 
DuFresne, supra note 18, at 176. 





Murphy, supra note 3S. The study was funded by an award from the Na-
tional Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of 
Justice. Id. at n.30. The study was conducted by Mary Ann Dutton, Ph.D. 
(Georgetown University Medical Center); Lisa Goodman, Ph.D. (Boston 
College); Dorothy Lennig, Esq., out of the House of Ruth Domestic Vio-
lence Legal Clinic, Baltimore, Maryland; and by Jane C. Murphy, Esq., Pro-
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ity of protection under the statute has proven effective in curbing 
some domestic violence in Maryland.96 While the purpose of the study 
was not directly aimed at determining the effectiveness of the civil 
protection order, the process revealed the important role the civil 
protection order can play in the life of the battered women.97 
The study examined the experiences of 406 women who sought re-
dress from domestic violence.98 These women were asked to fill out a 
questionnaire that listed thirty-nine possible domestic violence pre-
ventative strategies.99 These thirty-nine strategies were divided into 
"public" and "private" responses and were further subdivided into six 
categories of strategic responses termed: "Placating, Resistance, Safety 
Planning, Legal, Formal/Network, and Informal Network."lOo The 
study revealed that these women employed a combination of these 
strategic responses in an attempt to remedy their respective 
problems. 101 
The study also revealed some alarming statistics regarding the im-
plementation of the civil protection order. 102 More than half of the 
women who filed for civil protection orders never received the or-
der. 103 Furthermore, of the ninety-nine percent of the women who 
obtained the initial ex-parte order, only forty-one percent of these wo-
men were granted the full protection order. 104 Thirty-nine percent of 
the women never returned for the mandatory second hearing neces-
sary to obtain the full protection order, and the law enforcement of-
fessor of Law and Director of the Family Law Clinic at the University of 
Baltimore School of Law. Id. at nn.31-32. 
96. Id. at nn.53-58 and accompanying text. 
97. Id. at n.35 and accompanying text. Murphy indicates "the primary pur-
poses of the study was to identify and predict the patterns over time of 
battered women's experiences of violence and abuse, their appraisals of 
risk, and strategic response to violence." Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at nn.37 - 44 and accompanying text. 
100. Id. Placating: private strategies intended to change batterer behavior, do 
not challenge his control, mayor may not involve direct communication 
with the batterer; Resistance: private strategies intended to change batterer 
behavior, directly challenge his control, mayor may not involve direct con-
frontation with the batterer; Safety Planning: private strategies which are 
not intended to change batterer behavior, intended to increase resources 
and/ or options for escaping or preventing a future assault, does not involve 
direct communication with the batterer; Legal: public strategies intended 
to change the batterer behavior, involves the use of the legal system; For-
mal/Network: public strategies intended to change batterer behavior or in-
crease resources/options for escape, involves use of community (non-
legal) resources; Informal Network: private strategies which are not in-
tended to change batterer behavior, involves the use of informal resources 
such as family and friends. Id at nn. 39-44 (citing ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, 
BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING, 81 (2000». 
101. Murphy, supra note 35, at n.45 and accompanying text. 
102. Id. at nn.53-56 and accompanying text. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
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ficers responsible for serving the aggressor failed to do so in half of all 
cases. lOS 
At first glance, these statistics appear to indicate that the expansion 
of the available protections afforded by the civil protection statute 
were ineffective. As Murphy indicates, however, some women chose 
not to return for the second hearing because the initial ex-parte order 
was effective against the aggressor. 106 In fact, after interviewing wo-
men who applied for an ex-parte order but never returned for the full 
order hearing, many indicated that the ex-parte order "sent ... [the 
aggressor] a message."107 Aside from the use of private methods to 
prevent abuse, filing for a civil protection order ranked among the 
top ten in both the most commonly used and most helpful strategies 
for battered women.108 
Taken collectively, both studies indicate that the civil protection or-
der process is not perfect. 109 Overall it appears, however, that the leg-
islature has set the table for future proactive decisions. The new relief 
available allows for judicial flexibility when fashioning the appropriate 
relief. llo Now that the Maryland legislature has provided the basis for 
protection, the onus falls in the hands of lawyers and judges to edu-
cate not only themselves, but also the victims. I 11 Unfortunately, an 
uneducated legal community and a public that lacks awareness of the 
available remedies vitiate the steps taken by the Maryland 









Id. Courts are reluctant to grant a full protection order in the absence of 
seIVice of process for fear of violating an aggressor's due process rights. See 
infra Part VI.C. 
Id. at n.S6 and accompanying text. 
Murphy, supra note 35, at n.S6. Other responses included: "He knows she's 
serious; Ex -parte was enough time for her to get her own place; Got what 
she wanted, he stayed away; Good because cops check on him; Everything 
went the way she wanted and he's staying away; Yes, keeping him away." Id. 
Id. at app. A & B. 
Id. Notwithstanding the expanded protection, the civil protection process 
still has its imperfections. As Murphy indicates, most of the women who file 
for civil protection orders are employed and obtaining a full protective or-
der requires at least a minimum of two court appearances. Id. at n.71 and 
accompanying text. Additionally, as the above-mentioned statistics indicate, 
law enforcement failed to seIVe the aggressor with the ex-parte order over 
half of the time. Id. at n.56 and accompanying text. Also, the lack of availa-
ble, affordable legal representation increased the difficulty in obtaining a 
full protection order. Id. at n.75 and accompanying text. 
Id. at 177. 
See Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 254, 674A.2d 951, 956 (1995) (discuss-
ing that standardized, pre-printed forms are available for individuals unfa-
miliar with the statute); see also Klein, supra note 4, at SI2-13. 
See Klein, supra note 4, at S13. 
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IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE CIVIL PROTECTION OR-
DER PURSUANT TO MARYLAND'S STATUTORY PROVISION 
A. Purpose 
The purpose of the domestic abuse statute1l3 "is to protect and 'aid 
victims of domestic abuse by providing an immediate and effective 
remedy."'114 The statute helps establish a basic level of protection for 
a temporary period of time. 11 5 The protective order is effective be-
cause of the statute's provisions that prohibit further abuse, threats of 
abuse, harassment and contact with the victim.II6 
Courts are also authorized, under the statute, to craft orders that 
are responsive to each petitioner's respective situation. 11 7 For exam-
ple, when petitioner and respondent live together, it is rare that a 
simple court order to stop the abuse will have the desired effect. In 
cases such as these, the court can order the abuser to vacate the com-
mon home and grant the petitioner exclusive use and possession. 1 IS 
The statute defines "abuse" as an act that causes serious bodily harm, 
or an act that places a person eligible for relief1l9 in fear of imminent 
serious bodily harm.I20 
B. Scope 
Section 4-501 of the statute authorizes the person eligible for relief 
to file a petition alleging abuse against the alleged abuser, and re-
113. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 4-S01 - 4-S16 (Supp. 2002). 
114. Coburn, 342 Md. at 2S2, 674 A.2d at 9SS (quoting Barbee v. Barbee, 311 Md. 
620,623, S37 A.2d 224, 22S (1988»; see also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-
SIS (Supp. 2002). Section 4-S1S states: 
(a) Established; purposes - (1) The Secretary shall establish a pro-
gram in the Department of Human Resources to help victims 
of domestic violence and their children; (2) The purpose of 
the program is to provide for victims of domestic violence and 
their children, in each region of this State: 
(i) Temporary shelter or help in obtaining shelter; 
(ii) Counseling 
(iii) Information; 
(iv) Referral; and 
(v) Rehabilitation. 
Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 4-S1S. 
lIS. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-S0S (Supp. 2002). 
116. See id. § 4-S06(d) (1)(2). 
117. See id. § 4-S06( d). 
118. See id. § 4-S06(d)(4). 
119. Id. § 4-S01(b) (1); see id. § 4-S01(1). The statute instructs the courts as to 
those who are eligible for relief. They include current or former spouses, 
cohabitants, relatives by blood, marriage, or adoption, parents, stepchil-
dren, individuals who reside or resided with alleged abuser for at least 90 
days out of the last year before filing, vulnerable adults, and individuals 
who have a child in common with the alleged abuser. Id. The protection 
was not always this expansive. See infra Part III. 
120. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-S01(b) (1). 
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questing immediate and temporary relief from violence.121 A peti-
tioner can file in any district court or circuit court of Maryland. 122 
The petition is completed under oath and may include information of 
prior or pending actions between the parties the location of the re-
spondent; financial relief requested and the location of any child or 
vulnerable adult subject to the alleged abuse ifknown. 123 Also author-
ized by the statute is "emergency family maintenance,"124 mandating 
that a respondent temporarily provide support to the victim of abuse 
and to any children living in the home. 125 
Temporary child custody orders are another available remedy.126 
As previously discussed, children are often in harm's way when abuse 
occurs in the home,127 however, temporary custody orders can help 
alleviate such a risk.128 Children are often the most important aspect 
12l. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-501 (h). 
122. [d. § 4-501 (f). The Katsenelenbogen decision is indicative of a procedural 
problem inherent in the statutes practical application. At the district court 
level, the judge has the discretion to move the hearing up to the circuit 
court level. An appeal from a circuit court decision to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, however, could prove timely. The order's duration is 
finite, lasting only one year. [d. § 4-506(g). By the time the appeal is heard 
by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, the order may have expired, 
rendering the appeal moot. For example, both the Coburn and Kat-
senelenbogen appeals were rendered moot. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 
125, 775 A.2d at 1251; Coburn, 342 Md. at 250, 674 A.2d at 954. Yet, the 
magnitude of the issues mandated the Court of Appeals of Maryland's at-
tention. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 125, 775 A.2d at 1251; Coburn, 342 Md. 
at 250, 674 A.2d at 954. It is doubtful that the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land will grant certiorari to subsequent protection order appeals in the 
wake of Katsenelenbogen. Thus, the domestic violence victim would be better 
served if the statute mandated the district court as the first forum, because 
an appeal to the circuit court would most likely occur before the order's 
expiration, allowing for at least one appellate review in a reasonable 
amount of time (before the order expires). See Petitioner's Brief at 23, Kat-
senelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). 
123. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-504 (b)(ii) (1-6) (Supp. 2002). 
124. [d. § 4-506(d)(9). 
125. /d. The legislative history of this section of the statute describes the need 
for such a remedy: 
Short term financial relief can be critical to victims of domestic vio-
lence as a temporary measure to provide emergency help to victims 
of abuse who are extricating themselves from violent relationships. 
The use and possession of a home will not provide protection if a 
victim will be evicted for failure to pay the rent or mortgage, or 
does not have enough money for food or other necessities. To a 
victim whose childcare responsibilities prevent her from being self-
supporting, such short-term financial relief provides an alternative 
to living in a chronically violent relationship. 
Petitioner Brief at 17, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139) (quoting Letter from Attor-
ney GeneralJ.Joseph Curran,Jr. to the Honorable Walter M. Baker, Chair-
man of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (February 11, 1992) 
(in support of bill #282». 
126. MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(d) (7) (Supp.2002). 
127. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
128. Petitioner's Brief at 18, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). 
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ofa victim's life. I29 A batterer recognizes this reality and often threat-
ens to harm the children, obtain custody, or deprive the victim of ac-
cess to the children. I3o A temporary custody order via a petition for a 
civil protection order can help remove this method of abuse from the 
batterer. I3I Without the availability of such an order, many victims 
would be without protection or redress and remain in an abusive 
situation. 1 32 
Visitation is an issue closely related to custody. Section 4-
506(d) (8) 133 authorizes the court to grant visitation to the respon-
dent. 134 The provision, however, advises the courts to pay close atten-
tion to the safety needs of the child. I35 If the court finds that the 
safety of a child or a person eligible for relief is in question, the court 
can deny visitation altogether. I36 
C. Procedure/Application 
In order for a person eligible for relief to benefit from the availabil-
ity of frotection under the statute, he or she must first file a peti-
tion. I3 Relief under the statute is designed for pro se applicants. I38 
Standard pre-printed forms are available to aid the petitioner who is 
unfamiliar with the specific legal requirements of the statute. I39 The 
form also allows the petitioner to check off the desired remedies, such 
as emergency family maintenance or sole use and possession the fam-
ily vehicle. I40 Once a petition is filed, the petitioner appears before 





133. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-S06(d) (8) (Supp. 2002). Although not spe-
cifically stated in the body of the text, the statute also allows the court to 
grant temporary use and possession of the family vehicle, to order the par-
ties to counseling, to order the respondent to surrender any firearm to law 
enforcement for duration of the order and to order the respondent to pay 
all filing fees and costs of the proceeding. [d. §§ 4-S06(d) (10) - 4-
S06(d) (13). 
134. [d. § 4-S06(d) (8). 
13S. [d. 
136. [d. This provision also allows for supervised visitation. The court has wide 
discretion to fashion the visitation order in a manner most beneficial to the 
child or victim. [d.; see also ABA Resolution of Safe Visitation Orders, Report 
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates (Annual Meeting, July 2000) 
("When crafting visitation orders, creating safety provisions that provide for 
continued and consistent protection during visitation and visitation ex-
changes is critical."). 
137. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-S0S(a) (1). 
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At this hearing, if a court finds that there are "reasonable grounds 
to believe that a person eligible for relief has been abused," the court 
can issue the temporary ex-parte protective order.142 The petitioner 
can substantiate her claim by presenting physical evidence such as 
photographs, medical records, witnesses, her own testimony or any-
thing else within reason that will help her case. 143 The statute gives 
the court wide discretion, based on the petition and the evidence 
presented, to grant the order and the applicable requested relief.144 
The ex-parte order lasts only seven days.145 The temporary nature of 
the ex-parte order is purposeful.146 The legislature wanted to ensure 
that all due process concerns were addressed. 147 Because the hearing 
is ex-parte, the court mandates a subsequent hearing before the order 
can take on its most permanent form. 148 This second hearing pro-
vides the alleged abuser with notice and a chance to be heard. 149 A 
court may extend the ex-parte order as needed, but only for 30 days. 150 
As previously mentioned, long-term orders are not issued until a sec-
ond, full hearing. 151 
At this second hearing, the alleged abuser has a chance to present 
evidence to contest the petitioner's earlier allegations.152 If the re-
spondent fails to appear, "the court may issue a final protective or-
142. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-505(a)(1) (Supp. 2002); see also supra note 
135 and accompanying text. 
143. Coburn, 342 Md. at 254,674 A.2d at 956. 
144. See id. at 255, 674 A.2d at 956-57. 
145. Id. at 255,674 A.2d at 956 (citing MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-505 (c) (1) 
(Supp. 2002». 
146. See Coburn, 342 Md. at 259-60, 674 A.2d at 959. 
147. Id. at 261, 674 A.2d at 959. 
148. !d. 
149. Id. at 255, 674 A.2d at 956. 
150. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-505(b) & (c) (Supp. 2002». 
151. Id. The second full hearing allows ajudge to grant an order with a duration 
of twelve months. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(g). 
152. Coburn, 342 Md. at 255, 374 A.2d at 956. (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw 
§ 4-506(a) (Supp. 2002». The statute does not specifically address the type 
of evidence allowed at a final hearing although section 4-506(e) does pro-
vide the court with some guidance when it discusses the order to vacate the 
home. The factors are: 
1) the housing needs of any minor child living in the home, 
2) the duration of the relationship between the respondent and 
any person eligible for relief, 
3) title to the home, 
4) pendency and type of criminal charges against the respondent, 
5) the history and severity of abuse in the relationship between the 
respondent and any person eligible for relief, 
6) the existence of alternative housing for the respondent and any 
person eligible for relief, and 
7) the financial resources of the respondent and the person eligi-
ble for relief. 
Id. at 256,674 A.2d at 957 (citing MD. CODE ANN, FAM. LAw § 4-506(e) (1-7) 
(Supp. 2002». Also important in the evidentiary determination of abuse is 
the form that allows the petitioner to include evidence "known to the peti-
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der ... as long as the respondent has been seIVed with the temporary 
protective order or the court otherwise has personal jurisdiction over 
the respondent." 153 
If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that abuse has 
occurred, then the court is authorized to grant a final order, and util-
ize all the relevant remedies.154 The Coburn court notes several sec-
tions within the Family Law Act that direct a court as to what 
constitutes clear and convincing evidence. 155 Evidence of a previous 
abuse and the severity of the abuse are both examples of what may 
constitute clear and convincing evidence that abuse has or may 
occur. 156 
The statute also provides for a modification of the final order if all 
the affected persons are notified and a hearing occurs.157 At the mod-
ification hearing, based on the petitioner's evidence, a court can ex-
tend the order for six months beyond the time limit of section 4-
506(g).158 
D. State Comparison 
Similar remedies are prevalent throughout the country.159 Every 
state has a civil protection order statute. 160 All but six states have simi-
larly broad statutory provisions that give the courts wide discretion 
when fashioning custody and visitation arrangements under these or-
ders.161 Similarly, at least forty states and territories have provisions 











tioner concerning previous injury." Id. at 256-57, 674 A.2d at 957 (citing 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-504(b)(ii)(l) (Supp.2002)). 
Id. at 255, 674 A.2d at 956. 
Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(c)(I)(ii) (Supp. 2002)). 
When determining what is "clear and convincing," the court looks to sev-
eral factors all of which are listed. See supra note 152 and accompanying 
text. 
Coburn, 342 Md. at 256-57, 674 A.2d at 957. 
Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(c) (1) (ii) (Supp. 2002)). For a 
further discussion concerning the evidentiary standards see infra Part V. 
Id. (citing MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(c)(l)(ii) (Supp.2002)). 
Id. at 255, 674 A.2d at 956. 
See Klein, supra note 4, at 1043-44; see also infra Part VI.B. 
See supra note 51. 
Petitioner's Brief at 20, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). States permitting courts 
to award temporary custody protective order proceedings include: Mary-
land, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia. See MD. 
CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(6) (Supp. 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-
3:(a)(4) (2000); S.c. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(l) (Law Co-op. 2000); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 16.1-279, 1 (A)(7) (Michie 2000); W. VA. CODE § 48-
27(503) (3) (2000). 
Petitioner's Brief at 20-21, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). States permitting 
courts to award temporary financial relief in protective order proceedings 
include: Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia. See 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(d) (9) (Supp. 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 50B-3:(a) (6) & (7) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60 (c) (2) (Law Co-op. 
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National Council of Juvenile and Family CourtJudges advocate similar 
provisions. 163 Surprisingly, only thirty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia offer the protection of a civil protection order to a child of 
one or both of the parents involved in the dispute.164 
The presence of a child of unmarried parents also permits several 
state courts to issue civil protection orders between the parents of the 
child. 165 Additionally, forty-one states offer civil protection orders to 
unmarried partners of different genders that live together as 
spouses.166 
Eight progressive states have expanded their definition of persons 
eligible for relief under a civil protection order to include parties in a 
dating relationship.167 Overall, most states are continually taking 
1985 & Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-503(4) & (5) (Michie 
2001). 
163. See FAMILY VIOLENCE: A MODEL STATE CODE § 306(3) (d) (Nat'l Council of 
Juvenile & Family Court Judges, 1994). 
164. Klein, supra note 4, at 820; see also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(d) (9) 
(Supp. 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3:(a) (6) & (7) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-4-60 (c) (2) (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-
27-503(4) & (5) (Michie 2001); Diehl v. Drummond, 2 Pa. D. 376, 378-79 
(1989) (limiting the forum for the issuance of a civil protection order for a 
child to the juvenile courts). 
165. Klein, supra note 4, at 824; see also Robinson v. United States, 317 A.2d 508, 
510 -11 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that a protection order may be issued on 
behalf of a child against the child's mother's boyfriend with whom she and 
the child had lived for three years). 
166. Id. at 824; see also Yankoskie v. Lenker, 526 A.2d 429, 432 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1987) (articulating five factors that are characteristic of persons living to-
gether as spouses: 1) the duration of the relationship, 2) the frequency of 
contact, 3) the parties financial interdependence, 4) whether the parties 
raised the children together, and 5) whether the parties engaged in tasks 
designed to maintain a common household). But see Jackson v. United 
States, 357 A.2d 409 (App. D.C. 1976) (holding no mutual residence for 
purposes of issuing a protection order where couple only lived together for 
three months, the defendant did not pay rent, the petitioner considered 
the apartment hers, the couple had no children in common, and the defen-
dant gave his mother's address as his residence). 
167. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (West 1994) ("person with whom the respondent 
has had a dating or engagement relationship"); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 
209A, § 1 (West 1992). Defining family or household members as those 
who: 
[A]re or have been in a substantive dating or engagement relation-
ship, which shall be adjudged by district, probate or Boston munici-
pal courts consideration of the following factors: 1) the length of 
time of the relationship; 2) the type of relationship; 3) the fre-
quency of interaction between the parties; and 4) if the relation-
ship has been terminated by either person, the length of time 
elapsed since the termination of the relationship. 
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § l(e)(l) (West 1992); N.H. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 173-B:l(XV) (2001) ("'Intimate partners' means persons currently 
or formerly involved in a romantic relationship, whether or not such rela-
tionship was ever sexually consummated"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 
(Michie 2002) ("person with whom petitioner has had a continuing per-
sonal relationship"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-01 (Supp. 2001) ("'family 
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strides to expand their respective domestic violence protection acts. 168 
It is now up to the legal communities throughout the United States to 
employ this progressive legislation. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
took a step in that direction with its decision in Katsenelenbogen v. 
Katsenelenbogen. 169 
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently clarified a decision by 
the court of special appeals in Katsenelenbogen. 170 In so doing, the 
court emphatically stated that the lower court's decision did not 
weaken the state's efforts to obviate domestic violence. 171 The court 
held: 1) that a trial court's fashioning of appropriate relief in domes-
tic violence cases should not be concerned with the consequences that 
such relief might have in other litigation, and (2) the proper standard 
for determining whether a victim's fear of imminent serious bodily 
harm is reasonable, thus warranting a protective order, is an individu-
alized objective one. 172 
In this case the parties were married in April of 1986, and had three 
children. 173 The marital home was titled in the names of both par-
ties. 174 Mrs. Katsenelenbogen was a pediatric nurse and worked ap-
proximately twenty-four hours a week.175 She took medication for a 











or household member' means ... persons who are in a dating relationship 
... (or) any other person with a sufficient relationship to the abusing per-
son"); 23 PA. CaNST. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (West 2002) ("sexual or intimate 
partners"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010(2) (West 2002). A dating 
relationship is defined under the statute as a social relationship between 
persons sixteen years of age or older that is romantic in nature. Id. 
§ 26.50.010(3). Factors that the court may consider in making this determi-
nation include: (a) the length of time the relationship has existed; (b) the 
nature of the relationship; and (c) the frequency of interaction between 
the parties. Id.; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-207 (Michie Supp. 2001) ("are or 
were dating"). 
See genfffally Klein, supra note 4, at 912. 
See supra note 13. 
Id. 
Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 135, 775 A.2d at 1257. 
Id. at 137 -39,775 A.2d at 1258-59. The Court of Appeals of Minnesota took 
a similar approach when it ruled that a court may issue a civil protection 
order, "not only for actual physical harm, but also for acts which inflict the 
fear of imminent bodily injury." Klein, supra note 4, at 848 (citing Hall v. 
Hall, 408 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. App. 1987)). The court added that while the 
court must find some overt action indicating abuse, the court does not 
need to find an "overt physical act." Id. (citing Knuth v. Knuth, 1992 WL 
145387 (1992)). 
Petitioner's Brief at 2, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). 
Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. at 322, 762 A.2d at 200. 
Id. 
Id. 
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On or about December 9, 1999, Mrs. Katsenelenbogen asked Mr. 
Katsenelenbogen to move out of the marital home, and he refused to 
leave. 177 On January 1, 2000, Mr. Katsenelenbogen advised the live-in 
nanny that she was fired and would have to vacate the marital home 
because he wanted to use the room that she had been occupying.178 
When Mrs. Katsenelenbogen learned of this, and after consulting her 
lawyer, she told Mr. Katsenelenbogen that he could not force the 
nanny to leave. 179 During that conversation between the parties, Mr. 
Katsenelenbogen used a cordless telephone to call the police.180 
While making the call, he walked out of the house onto the driveway, 
and Mrs. Katsenelenbogen followed him.181 One of the parties' chil-
dren, Alexander, age 9, followed Mrs. Katsenelenbogen. 182 Mter Mr. 
Katsenelenbogen finished his conversation with the police, he dialed 
another number and began speaking in Russian.183 Mrs. Kat-
senelenbogen continued to request the phone, and according to her, 
Mr. Katsenelenbogen shoved her by placing his left hand on her 
shoulder.184 Also, according to Mrs. Katsenelenbogen, Alexander 
placed himself between them, and Mr. Katsenelenbogen then shoved 
the child.185 Mr. Katsenelenbogen "testified that . . . [Mrs. Kat-
senelenbogen] followed him, but he denied any contact."186 Prior to 
January 1, 2000, there was no record of Mr. Katsenelenbogen ever 
abusing his wife.187 
Mrs. Katsenelenbogen filed a petition for protection from domestic 
violence on January 3, 2000. 188 In that petition she stated that, "she 
was filing it on behalf of herself and Alexander, claiming, 'shoving,' 
'threats of violence,' and 'mental injury of a child.' "189 The incident 
that occurred on January 1, 2000, was described in an attachment to 
the petition. 190 The ex-parteorderwas issued on January 3,2000, and a 
hearing on the order was scheduled for January 10, 2000. 191 
At the January 10th hearing, both Mr. and Mrs. Katsenelenbogen 
testified.192 The circuit court issued a protective order, reciting that 
Mrs. Katsenelenbogen was a person eligible for relief due to the Janu-
177. Id. 
178. Id. 




183. Id. at 322-23, 762 A.2d at 201. 
184. Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. at 322, 762 A.2d at 201. 
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ary 1, 2000, incident in which Mr. Katsenelenbogen shoved his wife 
and their nine-year old son, Alexander. 193 According to the order 
that was executed by the court, Mrs. Katsenelenbogen was "badly 
shaken" and "afraid for her safety."194 On the protective order the 
only abuse cited was an act, "which placed a person eligible for relief 
in fear of imminent serious bodily harm."195 
The protective order was effective until January 3, 2001.196 In addi-
tion, the court ordered that: Mr. Katsenelenbogen was not to contact 
Mrs. Katsenelenbogen except for purposes of visitation and to vacate 
the family home; custody of the three children was awarded to Mrs. 
Katsenelenbogen; emergency family maintenance was awarded to the 
wife; and exclusive use and possession of the family vehicle was 
awarded to Mrs. Katsenelenbogen. 197 
The court's holding noted that the legislature made every attempt 
to ensure that the filing of a civil protection order would only occur in 
genuine instances of abuse. 198 The legislature requires all petitioners 
to file the petition under oath, and the petitioners must reveal any 
prior or pending actions between the parties. 199 The statute also pro-
vides an avenue for modification.2oo The court opined that, with 
these safeguards in place, other courts must not concern themselves 
with the consequences the order may have on pending or subsequent 
litigation.201 
The court also clarified the standard by which the petitioner's fear 
is measured.202 The court held that it is an individualized objective 
standard- "one that looks at the situation in the light of the circum-
stances as would be perceived by a reasonable person in the peti-
tioner's position."203 The court added that a person "may well be 
sensitive to non-verbal signals or code words that have proved threat-
ening in the past to that victim but which someone else, not having 
that experience, would not perceive to be threatening."204 Accord-
ingly, when Mr. Katsenelenbogen shoved his wife and their child, the 
193. [d. 




198. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 135-37, 775 A.2d at 1257-58. 
199. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-504(b) (Supp. 2002). 
200. ld. § 4-507(a). 
201. See Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 135-37, 775 A.2d at 1257-58. Contra Piper 
v. Layman, 125 Md. App. 745, 753,726 A.2d 887, 891 (1999) (discussing the 
"stigma" that attaches to a respondent when an order is issued against him/ 
her). 
202. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 138, 775 A.2d at 1259. 
203. [d. 
204. [d. at 139, 775 A.2d at 1259. Social science research indicates that threats of 
this type, if left unchecked, will commonly escalate into physical violence. 
Klein, supra note 4, at 859. Courts throughout the United States recognize a 
wide range of varying threats that will substantiate the issuance of a civil 
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court issued an order.205 With these newly defined standards in mind, 
one can now explore the role of the court in fashioning relief through 
a civil protection order. 
VI. ANALYSIS 
A. Analysis of The Court of Appeals Decision in the Instant Case. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis of the court of 
special appeals' decision by examining the arguments of the peti-
tioner.206 The petitioner claimed the lower court erred in three 
ways.207 First, that the court of special appeals' decision suggests that 
certain types of domestic violence are permissible.208 Second, that the 
petitioner argued that the lower court placed too much emphasis on 
the protective order's subsequent effect on future litigation.209 Fi-
nally, the petitioner argued that future petitioners could view the 
lower court decision as endorsing an objective standard, rather than 
an individualized objective standard for measuring the fear of immi-
nent bodily harm.210 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland then addressed each argument. 
The court disposed of the first argument by stating that the lower 
court did not intend "any such absurd conclusion," adding that the 
protection order, with the most common being a death threat. Id. at 860-
6l. 
205. Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. at 127, 762 A.2d at 1252-53. 
206. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 134, 775 A.2d at 1256-57. 
207. Id. 365 at 134-40, 775 A.2d at 1257-60; see also Petitioner's Brief at 12, Kat-
senelenbogen (No. 139). 
208. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 134, 775 A.2d at 1257; Petitioner's Brief at 12, 
Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). 
209. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 135, 775 A.2d at 1257; see also Petitioner's Brief 
at 26-27, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). Petitioner argues in her brief that while 
a protective order may have some effect on a future custody proceeding, 
courts still are bound by the "best interest of the child" standard and the 
presence of an order only lends to that determination and should not be 
ignored. Id. at 26-30. The Petitioner's argument is not wholly unreasonable 
in light of the statements made by the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland: 
If a protective order is issued without a sufficient legal basis, those 
consequences frequently cannot be erased. In that situation, the 
alleged perpetrator may suffer unfairly from the direct conse-
quences of the order itself, which may include removal from his or 
her home, temporary loss of custody ... [t]he alleged perpetrator 
may also suffer from the social stigma that attaches to the order. 
Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. at 335, 762 A.2d at 207. 
2lO. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 138, 775 A.2d at 1259; see also Petitioner's Brief 
at 26-30, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). Petitioner argued that the "reasonable 
petitioner in that litigant's shoes is necessary ... [because] [d]omestic vio-
lence, by definition, is not an offense that occurs between strangers." Id. at 
33. Another argument, not mentioned by the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land, offered by the petitioner was that the "persons eligible for relief' cov-
ers such a wide range of people that a reasonable standard would simply be 
unfair. See id. at 33-34. 
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lower court would have reversed the decision outright if it meant to 
classify the abuse in the instant case as insufficient to warrant a protec-
tive order.211 
In response to the petitioner's second argument, the court of ap-
peals noted nothing in the court of special appeals' opinion indicat-
ing that the respondent, Mr. Katsenelenbogen, deserves extra 
protection in subsequent litigation.212 The court of appeals did con-
cede that a protective order may have an effect on subsequent litiga-
tion, however, the court should only be concerned with doing what is 
"reasonably necessary ... to assure the safety and well-being of those 
entitled to relief."213 Additionally, as the petitioner argued, the legis-
lature included several safeguards to prevent any spurious claims.214 
The court indicated that the difficulty of overcoming the "clear and 
convincing" standard, the requirement that the petitioner take an 
oath and the requirement that the petitioner reveal all other collat-
eral litigation between the parties, provide ample protection to the 
respondent. 215 
Finally, the court addressed the final issue: the proper standard for 
measuring a petitioner's fear of imminent bodily harm pursuant to 
§ 4-501 (b).216 The petitioner urged that the standard be "a reasonable 
petitioner in that litigant's shoes."217 The court agreed with the peti-
tioner, stating that the proper standard is an "individualized objective 
one."218 
The court cited State v. Marr,219 a recent decision by the court that 
involves a similar individualized objective standard "applied in deter-
mining whether a criminal defendant offering the defense of self-de-
fense had reasonable grounds to believe himself or herself in 
211. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 134-35, 775 A.2d at 1257. 
212. See id. at 135, 775 A.2d at 1257. 
213. See id. at 1:37, 775 A.2d at 1258. 
214. See id. at 135-36, 775 A.2d at 1257-58; see Petitioner's Brief at 22-24, Kat-
senelenbogen (No. 139). 
215. See Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 135-36, 775 A.2d at 1257. Petitioner also 
mentions that the requirement of de novo review is yet another protection 
against the dubious petitioner. Petitioner's Brief at 23, Katsenelenbogen (No. 
139); see also Barbee v. Barbee, 311 Md. 622, 537 A.2d 225 (1988). The 
petitioner also adds that trial court judge continually offered advice to the 
parties during the hearing for the final order, thus providing an additional 
safeguard to the respondent. Petitioner's Brief at 24, Katsenelenbogen (No. 
139). 
216. See Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 139, 775 A.2d at 1259-60; see supra note 203 
and accompanying text. 
217. Id. at 138, 775 A.2d at 1259. 
218. Id. Petitioner also argued domestic violence is intimate and specific and 
that a petitioner would be ill served by an "externally constructed" and 
"non-individualized paradigm." See Petitioner's Brief at 34-35, Kat-
senelenbogen (No. 139). 
219. 362 Md. 467, 765 A.2d 645 (2001). 
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apparent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm."22o In 
that case, the court noted that the "objective standard does not re-
quire the jury to ignore the defendant's perceptions in determining 
the reasonableness of his or her conduct . . . so long as a reasonable 
person in the defendant's position could also reasonably perceive the facts or 
circumstances in that way."221 The court added in Marr that the issue is 
not whether the defendant's perception is right or wrong, "but 
whether a reasonable person with that background could perceive the 
situation in the same way."222 Finally, the court clarified any residual 
ambiguity remaining in the court of special appeals decision by stating 
"[a]ny special vulnerability or dependence by the victim, by virtue of 
physical, mental, or emotional condition or impairment, also must be 
taken into account."223 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland made it clear that courts were 
not to examine the subsequent effect the civil protection order will 
have on future litigation.224 The ruling further solidifies the court's 
role as an impartial fact finder. While this ruling is imperative if the 
civil protection order is to remain effective, some argue it still leaves 
room for the dubious petitioner attempting to gain a tactical advan-
tage in future litigation.225 The court cannot ignore the motives of the 
220. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 138-39, 775 A.2d at 1259. 
221. Id. at 139, 775 A.2d at 1259. Petitioner also noted a similar standard is used 
in sexual harassment cases. Petitioner's Brief at 38, Katsenelenbogen (No. 
139). Sexual harassment cases in Maryland utilize an individualized objec-
tive standard. Id. Before 1986, however, this was not the case. It was not 
until an influential dissent by Judge Keith in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 
805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) that courts began to recognize the need for an 
individualized standard. Id. The Maryland Legislature also recognized the 
necessity of the individualized objective standard in battered women syn-
drome cases. Id. at 40. In Banks v. State, 92 Md. App. 422, 608 A.2d 1249 
(1992), the court recognized that habitual victims of abuse are "expert[s] at 
recognizing the warning signs of an impending assault from [their] part-
ner[s]." 92 Md. App. at 429,608 A.2d at 1252. 
222. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 139, 775 A.2d at 1259; see also Parker v. State, 66 
Md. App. 1, 9, 502 A.2d 510, 514 (1986) (holding that when evaluating 
whether the arrest was proper, the court did not use a generic reasonable 
person standard, instead, it found that the proper standard is to view the 
circumstances "from that of the prudent and cautious police officer on the 
scene"). This type of standard is necessary in the instant case. While some 
may not consider a shove sufficient enough to place a petitioner in fear of 
imminent bodily harm, Mrs. Katsenelenbogen had chronic back problems 
that permanently disabled her. Id. at 126, 502 A.2d at 1251. As a result, she 
had a reduced work schedule, a handicapped parking permit, medication 
and used the assistance of a nanny. Id. at 126, 502 A.2d at 1252. Under 
these conditions, it is clear that a shove would constitute abuse as defined 
by the statute. Id. at 139, 502 A.2d at 1259. In the absence of an individual-
ized objective standard, however, such actions may not warrant protection. 
Petitioner's Brief at 35, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). 
223. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 139, 775 A.2d at 1260. 
224. Id. at 137, 775 A.2d at 1258. 
225. Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. 317, 343, 762 A.2d 198, 212. 
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petitioner. Although the statute is designed to prevent further harm, 
such harm could manifest in the form of petjury. 
The court, however, made the correct decision in the instant case. 
The civil protection order can be used for effective and immediate 
relief if drafted properly.226 The benefits afforded to victims who seek 
relief via the civil protection order arguably outweigh the burden of 
the few specious petitioners who attempt to gain a tactical advantage 
in future litigation between the parties. 
B. Standards Applied in Other States 
Other states have adopted individualized objective standards when 
confronted with similar situations. 227 Two states actually employ a 
subjective standard.228 Ohio uses a subjective state of mind standard 
when determining if a petitioner is in fear of imminent serious harm, 
so long as, that state of mind is not "utterly irrational."229 Similarly, 
North Carolina case law articulates the language of the standard as 
"placing the aggrieved party . . . in fear of imminent serious bodily 
i~ury."23o 
Two other states consider their test to be objective, however, they 
individualize them.231 New Jersey mandates a court look to the peti-
tioner's "objective fear" but then classify the fear as that "which a rea-
sonable victim similarly situated would have under the 
circumstances."232 North Dakota defines its standard in the following 
manner: "Intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that are in-
tended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another 
person. Disorderly conduct does not include constitutionally pro-
tected activities."233 The highest court in North Dakota further eluci-
dated in Williams v. Spilovof34 that" [b] ecause of previous physical or 
226. Klein, supra note 4, at 813. A properly drafted and enforced civil protection 
order is an effective way to reduce domestic violence. [d. Lack of sufficient 
detail, irregular enforcement and an uneducated legal community, how-
ever, vitiate the order's effectiveness. [d. 
227. Petitioner's Brief at 45, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). 
228. [d. 
229. [d. (citing Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, 613 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Oh. App. 
1992». 
230. !d. (citing Brandon v. Brandon, 513 S.E.2d 589, 595 (N.C. App. 1999» 
("The plain language used by our legislature does not require a trial court 
to attempt to determine whether the plaintiff's actual subjective fear is ob-
jectively reasonable under the circumstances."). 
231. Petitioner's Brief at 46, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). 
232. [d. (citing Carfagno v. Carfagno, 672 A.2d 751,758 (1995». The New Jersey 
standard takes into account the "power and control" element present in 
most instances of domestic abuse. [d. Under this type of standard, Mr. 
Katsene1enbogen's actions, such as abusing the family pet, isolating his dis-
abled wife by firing her live in nanny, verbally abusing his wife in front of 
their children, would all be considered. [d. 
233. [d. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01(1) (Supp.2001». 
234. 536 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1995). 
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emotional abuse, in some instances, the person restrained is well 
aware that his or her mere presence is sufficient to cause such emo-
tional stress as to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of the 
other person."235 Accordingly, a North Dakota court may issue protec-
tive orders based,on the mere presence of a respondent.236 
C. Constitutional Analysis 
Maryland's legislature, like most other states, has made every at-
tempt to ensure that the protective order statute is constitutional. 237 
The initial ex-parte hearing raises some due process concerns because 
the respondent is not present.238 The constitutionality of this process, 
however, has been upheld because the temporary order is granted in 
emergency situations and is of limited duration.239 Also, in Maryland, 
a court can grant a final order notwithstanding the absence of the 
respondent.24o The Maryland court warns, however, that sufficient 
notice in the form of service of process must precede the final order 
hearing as to satisfy due process notice concerns.241 
While Maryland's civil protection order statute has not faced a con-
stitutional challenge, domestic violence statutes, including the civil 
protection order provisions, have endured a myriad of constitutional 
challenges around the country.242 Several courts have ruled that the 
language of these statutes are not unconstitutionally vague.243 A Wis-










[d. at 385 (N.D. 1995) (citing State v. Monson, 518 N.w.2d 171 (N.D. 
1994»; see also Petitioner's Brief at 47, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). 
Petitioner's Brief at 47, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139); see also Williams, 536 
N.W.2d at 385. 
See Klein, supra note 4, at 905 n.633 (stating that Arkansas had the only 
statute struck down on a constitutional basis but has since revised that stat-
ute as to make it constitutional). 
See Voris, supra note 19, at 431 (citing Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767 
(C.P. Alleg. 1979); Missouri v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982); Mar-
quette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984». 
Voris, supra note 19, at 431. Ohio's temporary order lasts for ten days as 
compared to Maryland's that lasts only seven. [d.; Coburn, 342 Md. at 255, 
674 A.2d at 956. 
Coburn, 342 Md. at 255, 674 A.2d at 956. 
[d. at 255-56, 674 A.2d at 956-57. The court also states that as long as the 
court has some personal jurisdiction over the respondent, it can issue the 
final order in the absence of the defendant. [d. at 255, 674 A.2d at 956. 
See supra Part VI.C. 
See Klein, supra note 4, at 905-06 nn.637-644. In Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d 
1208, 1210 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988), the court ruled that a civil protection 
order that ordered the respondent not to "visit" the victim or "otheIWise 
interfere" with his wife was not unconstitutionally vague. See Klein, supra 
note 4, at 905 n.637. Similarly, a Missouri court held in Kreitz v. Kreitz, 750 
S.W.2d 681, 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), that a protective order that prevented 
the husband from entering the marital home was not unconstitutionally 
vague or overbroad in light of the physical damage the husband had done 
in the house. See Klein, supra note 4, at 905 n.640. 
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constitutional arguments that the statute was irrational and unreason-
able to effectuate its statutory purpose.244 The petitioner argued that 
the statute deprived him of liberty interests in his home, family and 
reputation.245 The petitioner also argued that the application of the 
statute results in cruel and unusual punishment and violates the fun-
damental rights implied in the Ninth Amendment.246 The court dis-
missed these constitutional claims and upheld the statute.247 
Similarly, state courts have upheld civil protection statutes against 
freedom of speech, association and equal protection challenges.248 
The procedural aspects of most civil protection statutes have also been 
upheld against constitutional challenges.249 A Maine court upheld 
the state's civil protection statute against a procedural challenge stat-
ing that the statute is civil in nature and does not violate the respon-
dent's constitutional right to a jury trial, notwithstanding the 
availability of possible criminal sanctions for a subsequent con-
tempt.250 Finally, a Minnesota court held that a civil protection stat-
ute that mandated clerks to assist petitioners in filing for protection 
orders did not violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of 
powers.251 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The answer to the domestic violence problem is an elusive one. 
While the civil protection order is not a cure-all, it does offer immedi-
ate and temporary relief from abuse.252 This avenue must remain 
open in the interest of safety for abused spouses and children. 
Many courts around the country adopt a similar view of the civil 
protection order, and similar domestic violence statutes.253 The stat-
utes have withstood numerous constitutional challenges and remain 
in effect today.254 The Maryland judiciary, like the aforementioned 
244. See Klein, supra note 4, at 907 (citing Master v. Eisenhart, No. 90-2897 1991 
Wisc. App. LEXIS 1270 (Wisc. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 1991». 
245. Id. 
246. Id. (dismissing the constitutional challenges to the civil protection 
statutes) . 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 907-08 nn.654-57; Schramek v. Bohren, 429 N.W.2d 501, 502 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1988); Illinois v. Blackwood, 476 N.E.2d 742, 743, 746 (III. App. Ct. 
1985) (noting that finding the respondent in contempt of the civil protec-
tion order for calling his ex-wife a prostitute and then threatening to kill 
her did not violate respondent's free speech rights). 
249. See Klein, supra note 4, at 908 nn.662-64 (citing Cooke v. Naylor, 573 A.2d 
376 (Me. 1990». 
250. Id. 
251. Id. at 908-09 nn.668-69 (citing Minnesota v. Errington, 310 N.W.2d 681 
(Minn. 1981». 
252. See supra Part IV. 
253. See supra notes 126-35. 
254. Id. 
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states, recently and emphatically reminded the state that its civil pro-
tection order statute was alive and well and will continue to protect 
women and children from abuse. 
The court of appeals' recent clarification of Maryland's standard for 
the issuance of the civil protection provides a consistent standard for 
both the courts and petitioners. This consistency will hopefully make 
Maryland's civil protection order that much more effective in the 
state's battle against domestic violence. The legal communities of Ma-
ryland should follow the high court's lead and get involved.255 Armed 
with this ruling and the changes in Maryland's Domestic Violence Act, 
the legal communities throughout the state should take affirmative 
action against the state's perpetual domestic violence problems. The 
court of appeals' endorsement of the civil protection order should go 
a long way in helping the victims, and their advocates fight this battle. 
Richard A. DuBose III 
255. The Murphy article indicates that having an attorney present during the 
application process "substantially increased the rate of success in obtaining 
a protection order." Murphy, supra note 35, at n.76 and accompanying text. 
The VAWA clinics are not enough. Pro bono volunteer work could alleviate 
some of the difficulties that face battered women and substantially increase 
the number of those who receive full protection. 
